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COMPULSORY DETENTION UNDER THE ALCOHOLISM 
AND DRUG ADDICTION ACT 1966: 
AN ADDICTION TO SOCIAL CONTROL? 
P. G. German 
Alcoholism and drug addiction continue to blight our modern existence. The 
law operates to regulate destructive social influences, and drug dependencies are no 
exception. The author examines the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Act 1966 with 
special attention to the underlying ethos of compulsory detention, identifies the 
appropriate legislative objectives, and considers how those might be best achieved. The 
current definitions of 'alcoholic' and 'drug addict' are for example too broad, and the 
criteria for committal and discharge confusingly inexact. 
The author advocates, among other things, an express recognition of patient 
rights modelled upon those in the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and 
Treatment) Act 1992. The author also considers the importance of individual culture to 
medical treatment, and how the 'least restrictive alternative' ethic might operate to 
determine a patient's course of treatment. The law in this area requires considerable 
revision to meet the needs of those it seeks to aid and protect. Existing legislation 
describes itself as an attempt to make better provision for the care and treatment of drug 
dependents. It fails in various ways identified by the author to fulfil its proclamation. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page,footnotes, bibliography and annexures) 
comprises approximately 14,600 words. 
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OOMPULSORY DETENTION UNDER THE AADAA 
You have asked me how I feel about whisky. A/right, here is just how I stand on this 
question: 
If, when you say whisky, you mean the devil's brew, the poison scourge, the 
bloody monster that defiles innocence, yea, literally takes the bread from the mouths of 
little children; if you mean the evil drink that topples the Christian man and woman 
from the pinnacles of righteous, gracious living into the bottomless pit of degradation 
and despair; shame and helplessness and hopelessness, then certainly I am against it 
with all ofmy power. 
But, if ... when you say whisky, you mean the oil of conversation, the 
philosophic wine, the stuff that is consumed when good fellows get together, that puts 
a song in their hearts and laughter on their lips and the warm glow of contentment in 
their eyes; if you mean Christmas cheer; if you mean the stimulating drink that puts the 
spring in the old gentleman's step on a frosty morning; if you mean the drink that 
enables a man to rr.agnify his joy, and his happiness, and to forget, if only for a little 
while, life's great tragedies and heartbreaks and sorrows, if you mean that drink, the 
sale of which pours into our treasuries untold millions of dollars, which are used to 
provide tender care for our little crippled children, our blind, our deaf, our dumb, our 
pitiful aged and infirm, to build highways, hospitals and schools, then certainly I am in 
favour of it. 
This is my stand. I will not retreat from it; I will not compromise. 
1 
- Address to the legislature 
by an anonymous Mississippi 
senator in 1958. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Guilty perhaps of a little over-dramatic oral delivery, the senator, nevertheless, 
accurately describes the paradox of prevailing social attitudes toward alcohol 
consumption. This same paradox is attested to and exploited by the talented slapstick 
comedian who plays the role of a hilarious drunk. He (it is usually he), knocks over 
ornaments, apologises profusely, repeats the entire glass-shattering experience, and 
then apologises profusely a second time. He stumbles about with slurred speech, 
clutches at furniture and other people, while at the same time getting all the laughs at the 
expense of his hapless co-stars. 
This comic scene remains, however, only one side to the paradox. The tragedy 
comes when this socially acceptable, sanitised, itinerant and on-cue drunk is no longer 
on stage or screen, but in the home and community as an alcoholic family member. The 
co-stars are loved ones, and the jokes ring long and hollow. Laughter is replaced with 
emotional and physical distress. 
There is no socially sanitised version of the drug addict1 to parallel our 
laughable drunk. This fact merely goes to emphasise the uncanny quality of the paradox 
which does exist concerning alcohol. 
This paper examines how our legal system should deal v, ith those persons we 
describe as 'alcoholics' or 'drug addicts'. Indeed, the prefatory task of defining just 
who these people are is one of the first, difficult questions to resolve. New Zealand 's 
Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Act 1966 (the "AADAA") established a regime 
whereby those persons labouring under the influence of alcohol or drug addiction may 
be detained in an institution. This paper will discuss and evaluate the social philosophy 
which underpins much of the AADAA. It compares the AADAA with a number of 
relatively new statutory regimes that deal with persons whom for a variety of reasons, 
require state protection or assistance. These include: 
(a) the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment ) Act 
1992 (the "MH(CAT)A"); 
(b) the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 (the 
"PPPRA"); 
( c) the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 ( the 
"CYPFA"); 
1 References to a 'drug addict' or 'drug addiction' are used by the writer as a residual category to contrast 
with 'alcoholic' and 'alcoholism'. 
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(d) the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the "BORA"); 
(e) the Health Commissioner Bill 1990 (the "HCB"); and 
(f) various other foreign and international documents. 
By focusing upon the philosophies reflected in, and effects mandated by these 
legislative changes, a number of fundamental issues arise. These are analysed at length 
and include: 
(a) the justification for a compulsory detention regime and the 
effectiveness of coercive treatment techniques; 
(b) the definitional question of who is an alcoholic or drug addict; 
(c) the status of voluntary patients once in the system; 
(d) patient rights; 
( e) patient representation; 
(f) review and appeal procedures; 
(g) the appropriate treatment model; 
(h) whether separate legislation dealing solely with alcoholism and drug 
addiction is necessary or appropriate; and 
(i) how well the system caters for minority cultural input. 
The general consensus is that the AADAA is in desperate need of revision.2 
Any comprehensive review must address the issues identified above. How they are 
resolved, however, is inevitably coloured by the fundamental objectives of, or focus 
which motivates the AADAA. 
The current AADAA regime is purportedly based upon the treatment rather than 
the penal model. 3 This contrast in guiding ethic is described elsewhere as being 
between welfare and justice models. The MH(CAT)A is generally an example of the 
former, and the PPPRA the latter. Each contain certain shades and hues of the other. 
For example, patient rights and representation reflect penal or justice elements to the 
AADAA, while treatment choices and paternalism reflect welfare or treatment models. 
The following explores where the balance should lie, and accordingly, how the issues 
listed above might be resolved. First, however, there follows an outline of the current 
statutory regime. 
2 B James Review of the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Act (Unpublished paper, Task Force on 
Alcohol - Related Issues, 1984). 
3 Long title of the AADAA. See below part I A. 
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I THE AADAA: YE ALKIES, YE JUNKIES, YE DRAGONS 
GREAT AND SMALL 
A The Detention Process 
Its long title declares the AADAA to be: 
[a]n Act to consolidate and amend the Refonnatory Institutions Act 1909 
and its amendments, and to make better provision for the care and treatment 
of alcoholic_s and drug addicts. 
Detainees may be either voluntary4 or involuntary.5 One must be careful, however, not 
to label "voluntary" that which is in truth, coercive, due to the pressures and sanctions 
imposed upon a subject who makes the "wrong" decision. 6 Nevertheless, any person 
may, pursuant to s 8, apply to a District Court Judge and specify the institution he or 
she desires to be committed to. If the District Court Judge is satisfied:7 
... whether by the admission of the applicant or by any other evidence, that 
the applicant is an alcoholic, and that he fully understands the nature and the 
effect of his application, the [District Court Judge] may, if he thinks fit, and 
if he is satisfied that the managers or the superintendent of the institution, ... 
are willing to receive the applicant into the institution, make an order in the 
prescribed fonn for the detention of the applicant, for treatment for 
alcoholism, in the institution .... 
Involuntary patients may be detained upon an application made under s 9. A 
relative,8 police officer, or " ... any other reputable person ... " may apply in the 
4 Section 8. 
5 Section 9. 
6 This is discussed further in part IV below. 
7 Section 8(4). 
8 Defined in s 9(8) to mean: 
... a spouse, parent, grandparent, stepfather, stepmother, brother, sister, half-brother, 
half-sister, son, daughter, grandson, grand-daughter, stepson, or step-daughter. 
This definition is superseded by that contained in s 2 of the PPPRA wherein: 
[r]elative, in relation to any person, means-
(a) The spouse of that person, or any other person with whom that person has a 
relationship in the nature of marriage; and 
(b) A parent or grandparent of that person or of the spouse or other person referred to 
in paragraph (a) of this definition; and 
(c) A child or grandchild of that person or of the spouse or other person referred to in 
paragraph (a) of this definition; and 
(d) A brother or sister of that person, or of the spouse or other person referred to in 
paragraph (a) of this definition, whether of the full-blood or of the half-blood; and 
(e) An aunt or uncle of that person or of the spouse or other person referred to in 
paragraph (a) of this definition: 
(t) A nephew or niece of that person, or of the spouse or other person referred to in 
paragraph (a) of this definition: 
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prescribed form9 for an order summoning the " ... alleged alcoholic10 to show cause 
why an order should not be made requiring him to be detained for treatment.. .. "11 The 
judge may issue a warrant for the alleged alcoholic's arrest if this is shown to be 
necessary to compel his or her attendance to be dealt with in accordance with the 
AADAA.12 
Upon being satisfied with the truth of the application and the willingness of the 
institution to receive the person, the judge may issue the detention order sought. 13 No 
order is made, however, without the evidence of 2 medical practitioners to the effect 
that they believe the subject is an alcoholic, and that his or her " ... detention or 
treatment... is expedient in his [or her] own interest or in that of his [or her] 
relatives." 14 
No person may be detained longer than 2 years. 15 Discharge, transfer and 
release on leave is regulated by s 17. Such decisions are made by the Minister of 
Health, supervising committee of an institution, superintendent or hospital board.16 
After 6 months a patient may apply to be discharged. 17 If refused, he or she may apply 
to the High Court. 18 The court may direct that a patient be released or released on leave, 
and may attach such terms and conditions as it thinks fit 
Anderson J summarised AADAA procedure in the case of In re Sorenson.19 
His Honour said: "[t]he jeopardy of the subject of the application is analogous to a 
person charged with a criminal offence carrying up to two years' imprisonment".20 
This is clear in the light of s 23, which declares that all provisions of the Summary 
Proceedings Act 1957 in respect of appeals from convictions or orders apply to any 
detention order made under the AADAA. They apply" ... in the same manner as if the 
9 See SR 1968/211 for the prescribed fonns referred to by the AADAA. 
lO Section 3 of the AADAA provides that that Act applies to drug addicts in the same manner as it 
does when it refers to alcoholics. 
11 Section 9(1). 
12 Section 9(4). 
13 Section 9(7). See below part III for a more detailed account of AADAA detention and discharge 
criteria 
14 Section 9(6). 
15 Section 10(1). 
l6 Now known as Crown Health Enterprises. 
17 Section 18(1 ). 
l8 Above n 17. 
19 Unreported, 16 October 1989, High Court Hamilton Registry, AP 176/89. 
20 Above n 19, 5. 
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person ordered to be so detained and treated or removed had been sentenced to 
detention within the meaning of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957. "21 
Anderson J opined that in addition to the express criteria, a further constraint 
exists upon exercising statutory discretions such as a detention order. This is " ... that 
body of public law which requires the discretion to be exercised on the basis of relevant 
information, exclusion of irrelevant matters, a weighing of rights of the subject of the 
application and of the community, and in a general sense the application of fairness."22 
This is a clear reference to judicial review, and is consistent with s 18(6), a provision 
which preserves common law remedies, including a tort action for false 
imprisonment. 23 
B The Criminal Justice Act 1985 - A Mysterious Omission 
In 1966, Parliament inserted s 48A into the Criminal Justice Act 1954 (the "CJA 
1954") to coincide with the enactment of the AADAA. Subsection (1) of the amendment 
provided that: 
If, on the conviction before any Court of any person for any offence of 
which drunkenness or the taking of drugs fonns a necessary element, or for 
any offence which is shown to have been committed under the influence of 
alcohol Of drugs or of which drunkenness or the taking of drugs is shown to 
be a contributing cause, it appears to the Court or Judge that the offender is 
an alcoholic within the meaning of the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Act 
1966 or is a person to whom section 3 24 of that Act applies, the Court or 
Judge may, if it or he thinks fit, make an order requiring the offender to be 
detained for treatment for alcoholism or, as the case may be, for drug 
addiction in an institution within the meaning of that Act. 
No parallel provision appears in the Criminal Justice Act 1985 (the "CJA 1985"). As a 
consequence, when the AADAA purports to deal with patients detained for treatment 
upon criminal conviction, it does so pursuant to a piece of repealed legislation. 
Section 21 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 provides for such cases by 
saying that where an unrepealed Act (the AADAA) refers to a repealed Act (the CJA 
1954), that reference is construed as refering to any subsequent enactment passed in 
21 Above n 19, 5. 
22 Above n 19, 5. 
23 Remedies and review procedures are considered below in part vn. 
24 Section 3 defines 'drug addict' and is set out below in part Ill. 
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substitution (the CJA 1985). There appears to be, however, no provision in the CJA 
1985 " ... passed in substitution for..." s 48A. 
Section 102 of the CJA 1985 expressly contemplates the situation where a 
person is subject to a sentence of imprisonment, but detained instead in an institution 
under the AADAA. Unfortunately, none of the CJA 1985 sentencing options appear to 
facilitate AADAA detention. Compulsory detention under the AADAA does not fit the 
community service model.25 It is not periodic detention,26 nor is it supervision. 
Supervision is described as being carried out by a probation officer, and is non-
custodial.27 Community care appears a likely candidate,28 but s 53 provides that it 
cannot exceed 12 months,29 and in all respects requires the consent of the offender. 
Corrective training applies only to persons aged 16 to 20 years, and is limited to 
3 months.30 The remaining candidates are imprisonment31 and preventive detention
32 
which disqualify themselves by definition. Part VII of the CJA 1985 deals with persons 
who are mentally disordered or under a disability. A person suffers a disability, 
however, only if:33 
... because of the extent to which that person is mentally disordered, that 
person is unable -
(a) To plead; or 
(b) To understand the nature or purpose of the proceedings; or 
(c) To communicate ackquately with counsel for the purposes of conducting 
a defence (emphasis added). 
Mental disorder is defined as it appears in the MH(CAT)A, and s 4(d) of that Act 
expressly exempts substance abuse, without more, from grounds upon which the 
MH(CA T)A jurisdiction can be invoked. 
If the omission of a s 48A replacement from the CJA 1985 was intended, 
Parliament may have contemplated that a person subject to criminal proceedings will 
also be made the subject of a s 9 AADAA application. After all, s 48A went on to 
25 CJA 1985 ss 29-36. 
26 CJA 1985 ss 37-45. 
27 CJA 1985 SS 46-52. 
28 CJA 1985 ss 53-57. 
29 Whereas s 10(1) of the AADAA 1966 provides for 24 months. 
30 CJA 1985 ss 68-71. 
31 CJA 1985 ss 72-74. 
32 CJA 1985 ss 75-77. 
33 Section 108(1). 
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expound s 9 detention criteria.34 This, however, takes the initiative
 out of the court's 
hands. One way of remedying the situation would be to amend s 9 
so that the court 
itself can also initiate s 9 assessment procedures. A more obvious pa
th, however, is to 
amend the CJA 1985, and clarify under what authority a court can se
ntence persons to 
alcoholism or drug rehabilitation institutions. 
II THE RATIONALE FOR COERCIVE TREATMENT T
ECHNIQUES 
Then the Lord said to Cain, Where is your brother Abel?' 
'I do not know,' he replied. 'Am I my brother's keeper?'
35 
A Benevolent Coercion & Civil Liberties 
The AADAA and other compulsory detention regimes like the MH(C
A T)A are 
predicated upon the assumption that it is permissible and proper m
edical practice to 
marginalise those persons considered a socio-medical threat to socie
ty. Article 5(1)(e) 
of the European Convention on Human Rights acknowledges this pred
icate, saying: 
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one sha
ll be 
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance 
with a 
procedure prescribed by law; ... 
(e) The lawful detention of persom; for the prcvcHtion of the spreadin
g of 
infectious diseases, of unsound mind, alcoholics, or drug addicts or 
vagrants .... 
What is it, however, that supports this assumption? The answer seem
s to lie in 
the assertion of social norms and paternalistic attitudes. Children, 
the intellectually 
handicapped and the mentally disordered plainly illustrate the fact
 there is nothing 
unusual about decision-making by proxy in medicine. Crafting a sensi
tive, yet practical 
focus for coercive treatment processes remains, however, exquisitely 
nebulous. 
The moment one speaks in terms of state coercion, there arises " ... a
 cloud of 
suspicion and vague disapproval from some quarters at least
.. .. "36 Once one 
determines, however, that some people lack the capacity to make com
petent decisions 
34 CJA 1954 s 48A(3)-(4). 
35 Genesis 4.: 9-10. 
36 P Tucker Am I My Brother's Keeper? The Coercive Treatment of Alcoh
olism In NSW (Unpublished 
draft of paper, ultimate vehicle of publication unknown, Australia, 1
991) 4. 
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vis-a-vis their own health and welfare, a duty to intervene may arise. In this regard, 
Tucker draws an analogy with the person who repeatedly attempts suicide. 
While it is going too far, perhaps, to say that an ordinary individual's failure to 
intervene in a suicide attempt is negligent, the inaction of a police officer or trained 
rescue unit member might be. Similarly, therefore, the state and its medical employees 
or contractors may be under a duty to assist.(albeit coercively) an alcoholic or drug 
addict. If we fail to do this because we fear assaulting our own leftist, politically 
'correct' rhetoric then we indulge ourselves at the expense of the less fortunate, and 
risk the 'guilt' of negligence. 
The focus for utilising coercion ought to be, therefore, a sense of social 
responsibility. In 1983, the Salvation Army Research Unit opined that the AADAA is a 
necessary agent of legal coercion, because " ... one of the marked characteristics of 
[alcoholism and drug addiction] is the denial [by] the patient that [he or she has] a 
problem. "37 Committal under the AADAA therefore takes on a paternalistic mantle fed , 
perhaps, by the court's inherent parens patriae jurisdiction still preserved in New 
Zealand by s 17 of the Judicature Act 1908. 
Civil libertarians are quite correct to point out that the AADAA regime is 
motivated by social self-interest as well as social responsibility or concern for the 
individual. Two fundamental purposes underpin the compulsory detention of drug and 
alcohol dependants. These are: 
(a) to treat dependant persons so they can again become productive 
members of society; and 
(b) to provide a benefit to society.38 
Other rationales declare that the purpose of an AADAA regime is to prevent drug related 
crime39 or deter future criminal behaviour.40 The connection between alcohol and drug 
related crime is well documented,41 and these rationales fall easily within (b) above as 
benefits to society. Other related social costs mitigated by the AADAA include those 
incidental to road accidents and public health services. 
37 The Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Act 1966 (Wellington Co-ordinating Committee On Alcohol , 
Wellington, 1983) 20. 
38 TL Hafemeister & AJ Amirshahi "Civil Commitment For Drug Dependency: The Judicial 
Response" (1992) 26 Loyola of Los Angeles LR 39, 45. 
39 Jn re Lopez 181 Cal App 3d 836, 839; 226 Cal Rptr 710, 712 (1986). 
40 Jn re Jiminez 166 Cal App 3d 686, 692; 212 Cal Rptr 550, 555 (1985). 
41 R & S Hayes "Criminal Justice & Public Health" (1988) 10 Australian Crime Prevention Council 
7, 13. 
9 
COMPULSORY DETENTION UNDER IBE AADAA 
A detention regime like the AADAA ought to contain carefully crafted 
procedural protections such as opportunities for review, patient representation, notice 
and information dissemination requirements, and an elucidation of both patient rights 
and state obligations. If these building blocks are placed thoughtfully and strategically 
within the new structure rather than left to form a type of lean-to appendage, then we 
can hope to achieve both the therapeutic and social objectives (a) and (b) above. 
Routledge neatly sums up these propositions, saying:42 
It is clear that the application of coercion in the form of committal to a 
treatment _institution, and the consequent limitations on liberty and freedom 
which that involves, constitutes something of a paradox, when it is justified 
on humanitarian grounds. The retention of a provision for compulsory 
treatment brings with it a responsibility to ensure that its use is limited, 
that it is both necessary and warranted, and that sufficient safeguards for 
patients' rights are incorporated. 
B How Effective is Coercion? 
Through measures such as the California Civil Addict Program, New York 
Civil Commitment and the Federal Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act 1966, civil 
committal as a form of compulsory treatment has been legal in the United States for the 
past 27 years, a period similar to that in New Zealand. It is difficult to assess the 
respective therapeutic benefits of coercive and non-coercive techniques due to " ... the 
prevailing pattern of clients having multiple treatment experiences .... "
43 Overall, 
however, when definitions of 'success' and 'relapse' are controlled, there appears to be 
no significant difference between coerced and voluntary groups.
44 
More detailed statistics reveal that while coercion works, patient variables such 
as sex, ethnicity, region of birth and age affect treatment outcome. Essentially, those 
with more to look forward to, such as well-paid employment, marital or familial 
stability and other catalysts for self esteem constitute better candidates for recovery. 
Inner-city alcoholics and addicts do respond to treatment, but the incentives are 
42 M Routledge Legal Coercion in the Treatment of Alcoholism (Department of Health Management 
Services and Research Unit, Wellington, 1983) 4. 
43 Leukefeld & Tims "Compulsory Treatment for Drug Abuse" (1990) 25 The Int'l J'nal of the 
Addictions 621,624. 
44 Above n 43, 627; above n 40, 4; G De Leon "Legal Pressure In Therapeutic Communities" (1988) 
18 The J'nal of Drug Related Issues 625, 627; DF Chavkin "'For Their Own Good': Civil 
Commitment of Alcohol and Drug-Dependent Pregnant Women" (1992) 37 South Dakota LR 224, 
248. 
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smaller.45 Quite separate from treatment outcome, Dr GM Robinson (FRACP) also
 
endorses the idea that indirect sanctions from relatives and employers, whether actual o
r 
threatened, are effective incentives for a person to enter treatment 'voluntarily'. 
Mark also plays down the significance of treatment quality and available 
therapeutic options in favour of patient variables as determinants of treatment outcome
. 
He overlooks, perhaps, the fact that therapeutic programmes and personnel mus
t 
identify the incentives which exist, and focus their efforts accordingly. A good
 
programme remains essential. 
Some might contend that if coercive techniques are no more effective than 
voluntary treatment, we ought to simply repeal the AADAA and concentrate our efforts
 
on voluntary patients. The fallacy of such an argument is that if carried out, all patients 
who had to be coerced into treatment and were then successfully treated would never
 
obtain much-needed treatment. Evidence indicates that some involuntary patients
 
undergo a motivational change once committed. Of such patients, Tucker referred to
 
New South Wales' Inebriates Act saying: "[w]e have had letters from patients
 
expressing gratitude for their commitment under the Inebriates Act" .
46 Abandoning a 
compulsory regime would deny assistance to such persons. 
C Other Harmful Activities: Candidates for Coercion? 
Whether we adopt a penal or treatment model for a compulsory detention 
regime, the object remains social control. The issue, therefore, becomes one of
 
methodology and the selection of targets. Alcoholism and drug addiction are plainly
 
identified by the AADAA. What of anorexia, bulimia, and tobacco smoking with its
 
attendant nicotine addiction and heart disease? All of these activities are harmful and
 
habit forming. Certainly, there are informal agencies to assist those who are afflicted.
 
But what distinguishes these addictions in order for them to escape formal, coercive
 
sanctions, including compulsory detention? 
45 FO Mark "Does Coercion Work? The Role of Referral Source In Motivating Alcoho
lics In 
Treatment" (1988) 5 Alcoholism Treatment Quarterly 5, 14-15. For example, patient
 variables indicate 
treatment outcomes are more favourable for Black women than Puerto Rican women.
 Black women are 
found, in general, to have greater self esteem and perceived by both partners to their m
arriages to hold 
more power. The Puerto Rican woman is said to defer to the authority of her partner 
more readily, 
discouraging self-determination. 
46 Above n 36, 7. 
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Doctor Ian Gibb expressed the view that the AADAA is 
" ... unnecessary, 
obnoxious in principle and logically unjustifiable. "
47 He points to lung cancer caused 
by excessive smoking saying: 
"[w]e do not certify and lock up heavy smokers and try to cure
 their 
addiction, nor do we certify them if they refuse to have their ca
ncer treated. 
Why, therefore, do we do so with alcoholics?" 
If anywhere, the answer lies in that complex web of social str
uctures, norms, 
values and boundaries which flex and bend to tolerate only 
a certain proportion of 
testing activities. Our criminal code is a less flexible strand to th
e web, while tacit dress 
codes and etiquette are more tolerant. There are important soc
ial boundaries and less 
important ones. This is reflected in the sanctions imposed. 
Some activities might also wield sharper, more irritating edg
es that sever the 
silken strands of polite society more readily than others. These 
stir the state to intervene 
and place the agent of such actions under coercive scrutiny. 
It remains to be discovered, however, just why alcoholism and
 drug addiction 
wield more jagged, testing edges. A tenable explanation is th
at those silken threads 
which regulate acceptable interpersonal skills and competen
t social functioning are 
stretched with a little more tension than others. Those which r
egulate eating disorders 
and non-mind altering drugs may flex that much more becau
se the damage is more 
confined48 or physiological. 
D Responsibility For One's Own Actions: The "You Could S
top if You 
Really Wanted to" Debate 
I The names' of the beasts: what are 'alcoholism' and 'drug add
iction'? 
There is much conjecture about the causes of addiction, and this
 is especially so 
in relation to alcoholism. Indeed, the focus of debate has of
ten been upon whether 
alcoholism is, or is not, a disease. The World Health Orga
nisation (the "WHO") 
recognised alcoholism as a disease in 1948. 
49 Various experimental studies have 
attempted to discover a genetic link to explain the old adage tha
t alcoholism 'runs in the 
47 I Gibb "Alcohol and drugs" (1981) 14 October NZMJ 276, 27
6. 
48 Dr Crawford "Alcohol and drugs" (1981) 23 September NZM
J 237,237. 
49 RE Kendell "Alcoholism: a medical or a political problem?" (
1979) 1 BMJ 367, 367. The WHO 
included alcoholism in its 'International Classification of Disease
'. 
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family'. 50 Thes.., experiments include comparing biolo
gical twins to differentiate 
between genetic and environmental influences.5
1 A similar differentiation is achieved 
under adoption studies, wherein those with alcoholic pa
rents and adopted by foster 
parents exhibited a higher incidence of alcoholism under s
ome conditions.52 
Traditional beliefs in free will and moral responsibility, 
however, also temper 
the inconclusive results gleaned from genetic studies. Ca
sting doubt upon the disease 
model, one writer points to the simple fact that:53 
... indicators of a steadily rising incidence of alcoholism 
are accompanied by 
a steadily rising conswnption of alcoholic beverages by
 the population as a 
whole. 
2 Narcissism and alcoholism 
We aren't really virtuous unless we enjoy being so. There
 is an 
interior component, the psychological posture in which o
ur 
virtuous acts cause us to be happy.54 
Without resolving the disease versus moral degeneracy de
bate, Warren Lehman 
developed a theory based upon an interrelationship
 between narcissism55 and 
alcoholism.56 It is, essentially, an environmental thesis. 
It does not, however, permit 
the addict to completely vacate responsibility for his or h
er actions. Lehman contrasts 
the simplicity and coherence exhibited by children and 
stage/screen humorists, with 
adult ideas of self regulation and ego, derived from Weste
rn theory.57 
Lehman is, perhaps, mistaken to limit his analysis by re
ference to 'Western' 
theory. Alcohol and drug problems are not so confined. A 
more accurate articulation of 
his theory would be to contrast narcissism with the ego
 simpliciter, and the way in 
which our ego incoherently twists ideas of freedom, self, k
nowledge and action. 
5o National Society on Alcoholism & Drug Dependence Inc Alcoholism: An Inherited D
isease 
(NSAD, New Zealand, 1985) 3; HW Goedde & DP Agarwal (
eds) "Genetics and Alcoholism" in 
Progress in Clinical and Biological Research: Volume 2
41 (Alan R Liss Inc, New York, 1987) 4. 
51 Goedde & Agarwal, above n 50, 7. 
52 NSAD, above n 50, 4. 
53 Above n 49, 367. 
54 Aristotle - as discussed by W Lehman "Alcoholism, F
reedom, and Moral Responsibility" (1990) 13 
lnt'l J'nal of Law & Psychiatry 103, 115. Lehman is a rec
overed alcoholic and professor of law at the 
University of Wisconsin Law School, University of Wis
consin-Madison. 
55 Narcissus (derived from the Greek Narkissos') was a you
th who fell in love with his own refection 
in water. Hence, 'narcissism' refers to self-love or self-po
ssession. 
56 Above n 54, 106. 
57 Above n 54, 106-107. 
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In his essay On Narcissism, Freud wrote:58 
The charm of the child lies to a great extent in his narciss
ism, his self-
contentment and inaccessibility, just as does the charm of
 certain animals 
which seem not to concern themselves about us, such as c
ats and large 
beasts of prey. Indeed, even great criminals and humorists
, as they are 
represented in literature, compel our interest by the narcis
sistic consistency 
with which they manage to keep away from their ego any
thing that would 
diminish it It is as if we envied them for maintaining a b
lissful state of 
mind - an unassailable libidinal position which we ourselv
es have since 
abandoned. 
According to Lehman it is our loss, as adults, of the s
imple coherency we 
possessed as children, that " ... constitutes the characterist
ic misery widespread in the 
modern West [nee world]."59 Lehman's theory fits sn
ugly with more traditional 
references to the importance of self esteem. In assessing t
he effectiveness of coercion, 
Mark refers to the impact of " ... high self-esteem ... 
1160 upon treatment outcomes. In a 
paper criticising the US government's 'zero-tolerance' po
licy upon drug use, Gostin 
recommends instead, a policy based upon health prom
otion61 and " ... empowering 
vulnerable people .... "62 
The 'characteristic misery' of adulthood is a pain for wh
ich alcohol or other 
drugs appear the sovereign remedy. Therefore, " ... if alcoh
ol is your problem, you are 
not an alcoholic .... Alcoholism is a disease named af
ter what appears to be its 
remedy. "63 This paper does not purport to resolve quest
ions as to the true nature of 
alcoholism or drug addiction. Such is the focus of mu
ch on-going scientific and 
medical debate. Lehman's theory does, however, warrant s
erious thought 
58 Freud "On Narcissism: An Introduction" (1961) 14 Standard E
dition 73, discussed by W Lehman at 
above n 54, 107. 
59 Above n 54, 107. 
60 Above n 45, 15. 
61 L Goslin " An Alternative Public Health Vision for a National
 Drug Strategy: 'Treatment Works"' 
(1991) 28 Houston LR 285, 292. 
62 Above n 61,294. 'Vulnerable' meaning those who are disa
dvantaged economically or educationally. 
63 Above n 54, 113. 
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III DEFINING "ALCOHOLIC" AND "DRUG ADDICT
" 
Nor am I suggesting that we should all become teetotallers, 
though it is worth reflecting that if ethanol were a newly 
synthesised substance the Committee on Safety of Medicines 
would almost certainly not allow it to be administered to huma
n 
beings.64 
With the gravity of forcibly depriving a person of liberty in 
mind, - especially 
by civil action - we must determine who ought to be brough
t within the grasp of the 
AADAA's compulsory detention regime. 
A Current Definitions 
Section 2 of the AADAA defines 'alcoholic' to mean: 
... a person whose persistent and excessive indulgence in alcoho
lic liquor is 
causing or is likely to cause serious injury to his health or is a 
source of 
harm, suffering or serious annoyance to others or renders him i
ncapable of 
properly managing himself or his affairs. 
Section 3 declares that the AADAA applies with similar effect 
to: 
... any person whose addiction to intoxicating, stimulating, narc
otic, or 
sedative drugs is causing or is likely to cause serious injury to
 his health or 
is a source of harm, suffering, or serious annoyance to others o
r renders him 
incapable of properly managing himself or his affairs. 
To extract the lowest common denominator from current leg
islation, a person without 
any psychological dependence upon alcohol may be committe
d as an alcoholic because 
his " ... persistent and excessive indulgence .. .'" is of " ... serious
 annoyance to others .... " 
In its submission to the AADAA review undertaken in the
 early 1980s the Mental 
Health Foundation declared that "[n]o person should be comp
ulsorily detained simply 
because they cause 'serious annoyance' to others. "
65 
Why the word 'addiction' is included in s 3 but omitted fr
om s 2 is a little 
mystifying. It could quite conceivably have read: "'[a]lcoholi
c' means a person whose 
addiction to alcoholic liquor..."; and hence been consisten
t with s 3. Without the 
irresistible desire for another drink that chemical dependenc
e entails, a person's drug 
64 Above n 49, 371. 
65 Mental Health Foundation Recommendations for Reform (Min
istry of Health File Records, 
Wellington, Undated) 2. 
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problem is attitudinal, and more likely to respond to familial and social sanction than 
coercive medical treatments designed for addicts. This fact is clearly attested to by s 33 
of the Evidence Amendment Act (No. 2) 1980, which relates to disclosure of patient 
communications by a medical practitioner to the court. Section 33 defines 'drug 
dependency' (in part) as a: 
... state of periodic or chronic intoxication, produced by the repeated 
consumption, smoking, or other use of a ... drug ... detrimental to the user, 
and involving a compulsive desire to continue consuming, smoking or 
otherwise using the drug or a tendency to increase the dose ... (emphasis 
lrlbl). 
Any definition is the product of legislative philosophy or objective. Broad 
definitions such as those in ss 2 and 3 of the AADAA indicate a taste for state 
intervention and a potential for expansive social engineering. Narrower, more refined 
terms of reference, on the other hand, speak of a treatment model. 
B Criticisms; Proposals; The Broad vs Narrow Bun-Fight 
Senior Lower Hutt Probation Officer, Mr G More proposed a broader s 2 
definition of 'alcoholic' to include " ... weekend heavy drinkers, and drink/drive 
offenders". 66 Inspector Dave Kerr also advocated wider use of committal orders to 
divert offenders with alcohcl or drug problems into a rehabilitation setting. In his view, 
" ... anyone whose use of alcohol or drugs ends in a criminal offence or causes 
disharmony at home or work, has a problem"67 for which he advocates AADAA 
processing. There certainly is 'a problem', but not one that warrants unleashing 
coercive technique. 
The danger inherent in broadening the 'alcoholic' and 'drug addict' concepts in 
the way advocated by Mr More and Inspector Kerr is obvious. There is no room for 
such intrusive definitions in civil committal proceedings where the sanctions unleashed 
comprise compulsory detention for up to 2 years. Even a drink/drive offender should 
not be committed under criminal jurisdiction unless the offender is a true addict. If the 
driver is not addicted, then that person's problem is, again, behavioural and attitudinal. 
It is not medicinally remediable in the traditional sense. 
66 The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 15 August 1983, 2. 
67 Above n 66. 
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In 1983, the Departmental Task Force on Alcohol Related Issues (the "Task 
Force") advocated narrowing the AADAA definitions. In particular, it suggest
ed 
deleting the phrase " ... or serious annoyance to others ... " from both ss 2 and 3. This
 is 
a good proposal. In order to sanction compulsory treatment under more clearly defin
ed 
circumstances, the Task Force endorsed committal where:
68 
(a) ... an individual's drinking [is] serious[ly] injurious to his health; or ... 
(b) ... [is] a source of serious harm or suffering, including psychological or 
emotional harm, to others. 
If " ... an individual's ... health ... " also includes psychological or emotional 
harm, however, this should be made clear. The term 'addiction' also ought to 
be 
included. As noted above, if there is no addiction (with the associated symptoms
 of 
chemical withdrawal), then detaining such a person for alcohol abuse does not treat t
he 
real problem. Not being an addiction, the alcohol abuse is caused by social, econom
ic 
or other emotional factors. 69 The writer also recommends that alcoholism or dr
ug 
addiction which is 'likely' to cause serious injury should be retained from the AADAA
. 
The AADAA's s 3 definition of 'drug addict' ought to include a non-exhaustive 
list of relevant substances in addition to the " .. .intoxicating, stimulating narcotic 
or 
sedative drugs ... " currently specified. These could, for example be "mind alteri
ng 
substances. "70 Otherwise, s 3 ought to be refined in a manner similar to that alrea
dy 
advocated for s 2, and according to that which follows. 
C The MH(CAT)A and a 'Dangerousness' Criterion 
Section 2 of New Zealand's MH(CAT)A contains a narrower definition of 
mental disorder from that contained in the (now repealed) Mental Health Act 1969
.71 
The MH(CAT)A provides, in part, that: 
68 Above n 2, 3. 
'Mental Disorder' in relation to any person, means an abnormal state of 
mind (whether of a continuous or an intermittent nature), characterised by 
69 This is discussed more fully in part VIII below. 
70 Above n 2, 3. 
71 That Act contained the following definition: 
"Mentally disordered"in relation to any person, means suffering from a psychiatric o
r 
other disorder, whether continuous or episodic, that substantially belongs to one or
 
more of the following classes, namely: 
(a) Mentally ill - that is, requiring care and treatment 
(b) Mentally infirm - that is, requiring care and treatment by reason of mental 
infirmity arising from age or deterioration of or injury to the brain: 
(c) Mentally subnormal - that is, suffering from subnormality of intelligence as a 
result of arrested or incomplete development of the mind. 
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delusions, or by disorders of mood or perception or volition or cognition, of 
such a degree that it -
(a) Poses a serious danger to the health or safety of that person or of others; 
or 
(b) Seriously diminishes the capacity of that person to take care of himself 
or herself. 
A 'dangerousness' criterion places an evidential burden upon the applicant seeking the 
subject's committal, and thereby provides the subject with a significant protection. 
72 
While (a) and (b) above are in the alternative, the 'dangerousness' criterion has been 
satisfied by, among other things, an inability to care for oneself.
73 This is entirely 
logical. 
It is the writer's opinion that the difference between 'danger' and the Task 
Force's terminology in part III B above is merely semantic. In the interests of
 
legislative consistency and clarity, the 'dangerousness' criterion should be included in 
AADAA definitions. 
D Who Makes The Applications? 
Section 9(2) provides that where an application emanates from the police or a 
11 
••• reputable person ... 1174 rather than a relative,75
 the applicant must supply reasons 
why he or she is the applicant and not a relative. There is, therefore, a presumption in 
favour of relatives rather than anyone else being applicants. The reason for this is 
obscure. The AADAA does not elucidate what good, acceptable reasons are, nor is 
there any express indication of the effect where a court decides the reasons are 
inadequate. The answer might simply be that, in such circumstances, a relative must 
resubmit the application. Again, the rationale is unclear. 
In 1989, Spittle and Longmore conducted a survey ofrelatives' opinions among 
the families of patients committed between 1983 and 1987 to an institution of the Otago 
Hospital Board.76 74 patients were committed, 63 of whom were male, and 11 female. 
71 were alcoholic, 2 solvent addicts, and 1 an opiate addict. Only 20 applications were 
made by non-relatives. 
72 Chavkin, above n 43, 267. See however, below part III G regarding burden of proof. 
73 In re Evans 408 NE 2d 33, 35-36 (Ill App Ct 1980). 
74 Section 9(1). 
75 See above n 8. 
76 BJ Spittle & BE Longmore "Alcoholism Committal: The Relatives' Perspective" (1989) 67
 Univ 
Otago Med Sch 57. 
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Relatives " ... reported considerable involvement in the decision to apply for t
he 
committal but would have preferred this to have been less. "
77 This preference accords 
with the view that a patient's family may be emotionally unprepared, or too 
distressed 
to make an application. This is supported by the survey which revealed that p
atients are 
often very resentful toward the applicant. 78
 As a result, persons who ought to be made 
the subject of applications can go without much-needed professional
 help. A 
considerable amount of familial angst could be prevented by rethinking 
the s 9(2) 
presumption. 
The families also recommended longer periods of hospitalisation and mo
re 
frequent readmissions for relapses.79 One should note, however, that if th
e current 
governmental ethos of transferring responsibility back to the community cont
inues, (an 
example is the deinstitutionalisation of mental health services) then there ma
y be some 
resistance to amending the s 9(2) presumption. 
Pursuant to s 7(h) of the PPPRA any person may, with leave of the court, app
ly 
to have the court intervene in another's personal or property affairs. Those w
ho do not 
require leave are: 
77 Above n 76, 57. 
78 Above n 76, 57. 
79 Above n 76, 58. 
80 See above n 8. 
(a) A person who seeks the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction in respect o
f 
himself or herself: 
(b) A relative80 or an auorney of the pe1son in respect of whom the 
application is made: 
( c) A social worker: 
(d) A medical practitioner: 
(e) A representative of any group that is engaged, otherwise than for 
commercial gain, in the provision of services and facilities for the welfare 
of 
persons in relation to whom the Court has jurisdiction in accordance 
with ... this Act: 
(t) Where the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction is sought in respect of any
 
person who is a patient or a resident in any hospital, home, or other 
institution, the superintendent, licensee, supervisor, or other person in 
charge of the hospital, home, or other institution: 
(g) Where the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction is sought in respect of any 
person subject to a property order, the manager of that person's property. 
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Essentially, this is a list of those persons considered "reputable person[s]" i
n AADAA 
terrninology81 for purposes of the PPPRA. A positive aspect of s 7 is that it
 eliminates 
any presumption in favour of a relative being the applicant 
Voluntary patients are discussed fully in part IV of this paper. Subsections 
(b) 
to (e) are entirely relevant in the AADAA context, but subs (f) focuses unn
ecessarily 
upon the elderly and infirm. Subsection (g) could also be omitted from the AA
DAA and 
more simply dealt with under the PPPRA's subs (h). In such an amended
 form, the 
PPPRA's s 7 description of suitable applicants should be supplanted into th
e AADAA 
to replace "reputable person" from s 9(1) of the latter Act 
E The Criteria For Committal 
Pursuant to s 9(6), 2 medical practitioners must certify that a person is 
an 
alcoholic. It is, therefore, partly for the benefit of the medical professio
n that the 
definitions be clear. Prior to making an order, however, the court must not on
ly receive 
the requisite certifications, but also believe making the " ... order for [the
 patient's] 
detention and treatment as such is expedient in [the patient's] own interest o
r in that of 
[the patient's] relatives."82 This expediency criterion indicates that not every
 alcoholic 
or addict caught by ss 2 or 3 will be committed automatically. Granting the 
committal 
order sought by an applicant is a discretionary decision anyway. It is uncle
ar whether 
the expediency criterion does any more than recognise this fact. 
Section 9(7) refers to the court being satisfied with the " ... truth of 
the 
application ... " before it can make the order sought. Just what this mea
ns is also 
uncertain. Again, the detention order is a discretionary decision, made upon t
he basis of 
evidence adduced by the applicant and medical practitioners, to which
 the court 
attributes due weight. 'Truth' conjures up images of an utter 'certainty' o
r 'without 
doubt' standard of proof. Instead of providing that: 
... the [District Court Judge] may, if he thinks fit, and if he is satisfied of th
e 
truth of the application ... make an order requiring the alcoholic to be detained 
for treatment... 
s 9(7) could simply say: 
8l AADAA 1966 s 9(1). 
82 Section 9(6). 
... the court may, upon the evidence of the application and in accordance wi
th 
this Act, if it thinks fit, ... make an order requiring the alcoholic to be 
detained for treatment.. .. 
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On 12 February 1981 the National Consultative Committee on Alcoholism (t
he 
"NCCA")83 wrote to Mr GF Gair, Minister of Health, enclosing proposed am
endments 
to the AADAA. Aimed at providing medical practitioners with background inf
ormation, 
the proposed s 9(6A) seeks to supply each practitioner involved with cop
ies of the 
application and any supporting statements, and empowers the practitioner to 
interview 
" ... the applicant and any other person who may be able to contribute informa
tion as to 
the health and conduct of the alleged alcoholic. "
84 This appears a useful amendment, 
expanding the database of relevant information upon which a practitioner m
akes the 
assessment. 
A proposed s 9A purports to improve the committal process by permitting o
ne 
month adjournments, ostensibly for assessments, to a maximum of two mon
ths.85 The 
value of this discretion, however, is questionable. Section 9(5) of the AADA
A already 
provides a power to compel a person to undergo assessment by 2 medical pra
ctitioners. 
If other entitities such as the institutions of ultimate destination are to be brough
t into 
the assessment process, then they ought to be a part of the s 9 committal appl
ication. If 
not, then the proposed adjournments appear superfluous. This is especially 
so when s 
9A provides for lengthy interim stays in outpatient or full-time custodial in
stitutions 
during the adjournment. The assessment process must be streamlined a
nd avoid 
unnecessary intrusion. Lengthy interim detention for assessment holds the p
otential to 
ber,ome a convenient receptacle for deferring hard cases. 
86 
F Discharge Criteria 
After 6 months a patient may apply for discharge.
87 Under s 18(3), a patient 
may be discharged in toto or upon terms, where continued detention is no 
longer 
expedient or is unlawful. In deciding whether to grant a discharge, the c
ourt may 
consider the fact any relative or friend is able and willing to take the case of th
e patient. 
This in fact modifies, or at least identifies one factor that determines what is,
 or is not, 
83 Members of the NCCA being: Justice AA Coates, former chairman, 19
73 Royal Commission on 
Sale of Liquor; Major John Gainsford, superintendent, Salvation Army Brid
ge Programme, Wellington; 
Dr ME Vijaysenan, psychiatrist, Porirua Hospital; Dr N Walker, medical di
rector, Mahu Alcoholism 
Clinic, Christchurch; Sir Charles Burns, medical adviser, National Society 
on Alcoholism & Drug 
Dependence; Mr A Johnstone, community services consultant, Alcoholic Li
quor Advisory Council. 
84 Proposal To Amend the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Act 1966 ( National 
Consultative 
Committee on Alcoholism, Wellington, 1981) 2. 
85 Above n 84, 2-3. 
86 One might note, however, the lengthy assessment procedure in ss 8-16 of th
e MH(CA T)A where a 
patient can undergo preliminary assessment, 5 more days, and then a further
 period of 14 days after 
which a court can examine the patient upon appeal. 
87 Section 18(1). 
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expedient under s 18(3). The crucial question is whether or not this same f
act modifies 
the s 9(6) expediency test for committing a person in the first place. Logic
ally, there is 
no reason why it should not. Its absence from s 9(6) is anomalous and easi
ly rectified. 
G The Burden and Standard of Proof 
Section 9(1) provides that upon receipt of an application, the court 
may 
summon the alleged alcoholic " ... to show cause why an order should n
ot be made 
requiring him to be detained for ~eatment for alcoholism in an institution." 
When this is 
compared with s 9(7) under which the court must be " ... satisfied of the
 truth of the 
application", just where the burden of proof lies is a little confusing. 
Both the wisdom and the logic of placing the burden of proof on the subjec
t and 
not the applicant in s 9(1) is questionable. In a criminal trial it rests with the C
rown. 
This is so, even where the array of potential sanctions does not include in
carceration. 
Why then, when civil proceedings are the precursor to involuntary detentio
n should the 
burden of proof be reversed? 
The United States Supreme Court pronounced that " ... due process require
s the 
state to justify confinement by proof .... "8
8 On the question of standard, however, US 
instruction is more diffuse. US courts juggle standards such as " ... the pr
eponderance 
of the evidence, "89 " ... clear and convincing proof ... "90 and " ... beyond a
 reasonable 
doubt".9 1 
Addington v Texas 92 addressed the question of the appropriate standard
 of 
proof when committing a mentally ill person. The court rejected the prepo
nderance of 
evidence standard as an inadequate protection against erroneous comm
ittal. It also 
rejected the beyond a reasonable doubt standard and its concomitant a
nalogy with 
criminal trials. Rather, the court endorsed an intermediate standard o
f clear and 
convincing proof. In making this decision, the court expressed the view
 that in civil 
committal proceedings there are continuous opportunities to review an
d correct an 
erroneous committal.93 
88 Addington v Texas 441 US 418,427 (1979), (emphasis added). 
89 See People v Moore 69 Cal 2d 674, 685; 446 P 2d 800, 807 (1968). This stan
dard is equivalent to 
the Commonwealth's 'balance of probabilities'. 
90 Above n 88, 433. 
9l People v Thomas 19 Cal 3d 630, 632-633; 566 P 2d 228,229; 139 Cal R
ptr 594, 595 (1977). 
92 Above n 88. 
93 Above n 88,429. Review proceedings are discussed in part VII below. 
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The writer unearthed no specific judicial consideration of the AADAA
's 
standard of proof. Quite how one would, in practice, distinguish 'clear and c
onvincing 
proof from 'the preponderance of evidence' without, in actual fact mo
ving to a 
standard of evidence 'beyond a reasonable doubt' is inscrutably recon
dite. The 
Commonwealth standard of proof on the balance of probabilities is clear and t
ested. 
In Sorenson, Anderson J compared the situation of an alleged alcoholic or drug
 
addict under the AADAA to that of a person charged with a criminal offence c
arrying up 
to 2 years imprisonment. This might seem to support a criminal burden and s
tandard of 
proof. However, His Honour's comments were merely descriptive of the 
AADAA. 
They cannot be interpreted as definitively encapsulating his opinion as to t
he correct 
burden and standard of proof for AADAA proceedings. 
Furthermore, in Pallin v Department of Social Welfare , 
94 the Court of Appeal 
held that proceedings under the (now repealed) Children and Young Persons
 Act 1974 
are civil proceedings. 95 The case concerned a care, protection or control ord
er over a 
seven year old child. Cooke J rejected the idea of "quasi-criminal" proceed
ings 
somewhere in between the civil and criminal even when (as with the 
AADAA) 
" ... elements of criminal procedure under under the Summary Proceeding
s Act are 
employed. "96 
The philosophy behind compulsory detention also impacts upon this discussi
on 
of standard of proof. The criminal standard is a coincident of maintaining an a
lcoholism 
and drug addiction scheme based upon the penal model. If, however, the motive
 is to 
treat and rehabilitate persons, then a medical model is more appropriate. The
 latter fits 
more comfortably with the AADAA's self-proclamation as an Act designed to
 " ... make 
better provision for the care and treatment of alcoholics and drug addicts. "9
7 The civil 
standard of proof, therefore, is applied with logical consistency. This is e
ven more 
obvious once patient rights are recognised and adequately protected,9
8 and an effective 
review procedure99 injected. 
94 [ 1983] NZLR 266. 
95 Above n 94, 275. 
96 Above n 94, 269. 
97 See above part I A. 
98 See below parts V and VI. 
99 See below part VII. 
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H ThePPPRA 
Respondents to Spittle and Longmore's study also favoured controlling t
he 
finances of a committed person under part ill of the PPPRA.100 The Family
 CourtlOl 
has jurisdiction to grant a property order, appointing a manager to control 
a person's 
financial and property affairs.102 This is possible where the subject of an a
pplication 
" .. .lacks wholly or partly the competence to manage his or her affairs in rela
tion to his 
or her property." 103 
This is altogether reasonable. The PPPRA provides good protection for t
he 
subject, alongside specific provision contemplating the use of property orders
 for those 
persons admitted to " ... any hospital, home or other institution as a p
atient or 
resident.. .. "104 Section 24 presumes the subject competent to manage prope
rty affairs 
until the contrary is proved, thereby placing the burden of proof correctly
 upon the 
applicant 
Section 25(3) protects the brave, eccentric or legally competent but stupid.
 It 
provides that the fact a person manages or plans to manage his or her affairs: 
.. .in a manner that a person of ordinary prudence would not adopt given the 
same circumstances is not in itself sufficient ground for the exercise of [the 
court's jurisdiction]. 
Section 6 deals with personal rights rather than those over property and is 
of similar 
effect. Similarly, s 28 articulates two primary objectives of the Cou
rt, which 
underscore the subject's status as a person first, and patient or incompeten
t, second. 
This is lacking from the AADAA's current form. The PPPRA's primary o
bjectives 
are:105 
lOO Above n 76, 57. 
(a) To make the least restrictive intervention possible ... having regard to the
 
degree of that person's lack of competence [; and] 
(b) To enable or encourage that person to exercise and develop such 
competence as he or she has to manage his or her own affairs in relation to 
his or her property to the greatest extent possible. 
101 "Court" is so defined ins 2. 
102 Section 32. 
103 Section 25(1)(b). 
l04 Section 27(1)(a). 
105 Section 28(a)-(b). 
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An order may be over selected parts, or over all of a person's property.
106 It ceases to 
have effect upon (among other events) the death of the person subject to the order,
107 
and where the Court reviews and discharges the order pursuant to s 87. 
Section 10(1) of the PPPRA lists the kinds of order a court can make in respect 
of a person under that jurisdiction. These include: 
... (d) An order that the person shall enter, attend at, or leave an institution 
specified in the order, not being a psychiatric hospital or a licensed 
institution under the Mental Health Act 1969 .. ; 
(f) An order that the person be provided with medical advice or treatment of a 
kind specified in the order..;[and] 
(g) An order that the person be provided with educational, rehabilitative, 
therapeutic, or other services of a kind specified in the order .... 
These provisions could, conceivably, encompass committal to a drug rehabilitation 
programme and make the AADAA redundant The order would then have to specify all 
of the terms and conditions already articulated in the AADAA. More realistically, a 
court might utilise s 10 to commence involuntary AADAA committal proceedings 
without the need for a second application under that jurisdiction. 
The writer does not advocate automatic application of the PPPRA to AADAA 
patients. Even where it is invoked, the presumption of competence remains, as does its 
prime directive i.'1 favour of making the least restrictive intervention possible. It is these 
underlying principles which ought to be supplanted into a revised AADAA to form part 
of its treatment model philosophy. 
IV VOLUNTARY PATIENTS: "007, YOU WILL ACCEPT THIS 
ASSIGNMENT OR BE SENT UNDERCOVER TO THE 
SIBERIAN MINES!. ... PLEASE TAKE YOUR TIME." 
A 'Voluntary' Applications 
Pursuant to s 8, persons " ... desirous of being received into an institution may 
make application ... " 108 in writing, specifying the institution he or she desires to be 
106 Section 29(2). 
107 Section 34(1)(a). 
108 Section 8(1). 
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committed to.109 The Mental Health Foundation of New Zealand noted over 10 years 
ago, however, that :110 
[n]ot surprisingly, few such applicants are genuinely 'volunteers'. 
Applications under s 8 are usually made in response to family pressure or as 
a result of the applicant being presented with a choice between making the 
application or being sent to prison. 
A truly voluntary patient may be one who attends a local meeting of Alcoholics 
Anonymous, or a similar group. Section 8's problem of thinly-vailed compulsion is 
compounded by the fact it requires no certification from a medical practitioner. If s 8 
was intended to be a fast track path to committal, it succeeds. It succeeds, however, at 
great cost to the alleged alcoholic or drug addict. Despite s 8(1) requiring that the 
'volunteer' appear in person, and that the court be satisfied the applicant " ... fully 
understands the nature and effect..." of the application, he or she is still largely 
unprotected. Pressure from family or employer may, for example, still be influential 
when before the court. The concept of voluntariness is nebulous and the writer 
recommends that in accordance with the criticisms cited above, s 8 should be repealed. 
Inserting a requirement for medical certification will help protect an alleged 
alcoholic or addict. Contrary to the opinions of TL Hafemeister, AJ Amirshahi and the 
court in In re Walker however, a medical examination does not serve" ... to ensure that 
the action truly is voluntary .... "111 It might help determine whether a person in fact 
requires treatment, but is quite irrelevant to the issue of whether an applicant is actually 
acting voluntarily. 
B The Status Of Voluntary Patients Once Within The AADAA System 
Under s 8(2), the voluntary applicant must " ... undertake to remain in the 
institution, for treatment for alcoholism, until he [ or she] is released or discharged .... " 
A patient might therefore revoke her consent as a voluntary patient after admission, but 
have no right to discharge herself. This contrasts with the rights of an informal 
psychiatric patient under the (now repealed) Mental Health Act 1969.1
12 There appears, 
109 Ifs 8 is retained, a good amendment is that suggested by the National Consultative Committee on 
Alcoholism. This is to insert its proposed s 8(5) permitting the court (with the applicant's consent)
 to 
substitute another institution where the institution specified refuses to accept the applicant. If the 
applicant does not consent to this substitution, and the court wishes to make a committal order, th
en it 
proceeds as if a s 9 application were made. 
l 10 Above n 42, I. 
111 Above n 36, 82; 71 Cal 2d 54, 59; 453 P 2d 456, 460 (1969). 
112 M Routledge Review of the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Act -A discussion document prepared
 
for the Task Force on Alcohol (Department of Health Management Services & Research Unit, 
Wellington, 1983) para 4.2. 
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in fact, to be no distinction between voluntary and involuntary patients beyond the 
committal process. Once within the system, a 'voluntary' patient must wait out the 6 
month period before seeking discharge, as must an involuntary patient. 
Fagan and Fagan assert that " .. .it would be nonsensical to apply legal coercion 
to a voluntary self-referred patient."113 In Ex parte Lloyd, Emery Lloyd had sought 
treatment for narcotic addiction. He agreed to " ... submit to confinement at the [narcotic] 
farm for such period as was estimated by the Surgeon-General to be necessary to effect 
a cure of his addiction or until he ceased to be an addict within the meaning of the 
law. "114 Emery signed a document to this effect, and authorised those in charge of the 
farm to use any reasonable method of restraint to prevent his unscheduled departure. 
Emery subsequently resisted his detention, and District Judge Ford found that 
Emery's continued confinement was contrary to the 5th and 13th Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States of America. The 5th provides that "[n]o person 
shall...be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law ... ," and the 
13th that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, 
or any place subject to their jurisdiction." 115 The presumption in US jurisdictions is 
that a voluntary patient receives " ... additional freedoms, including the ability to leave 
the facility. "116 
Although New Zealand is not subject to US jurisdiction or its constitution, the 
court in Ex parte Lloyd also held that continued confinement was contrary to the spirit 
of the law which authorised voluntary treatment. District Judge Ford characterised that 
law as 'charitable and benevolent' rather than 'penal or criminal'.
117 The AADAA's 
long title also reflects this spirit of charity and benevolence. 
Therefore, if the writer's recommendation that voluntary committal be 
abandoned (above part IV A) is ignored, then a voluntary patient should remain as such 
post-committal, and have the right to discharge herself. If the institution or any other 
person feels the discharge is premature, they ought to commence involuntary committal 
proceedings under s 9. 
l 13 RW & NM Fagan "The Impact of Legal Coercion on the Treaunent of Alcoholism" [1982) 
Journal of Drug Issues 103 as quoted in above n 41, 2. 
114 13 F Supp 1005, 1005 (1936). 
115 Above n 36, 83 fn 312. 
116 Above n 36, 84; Chavkin, above n 43, 279. 
117 Above n 115. 
27 
ffiMPULSORY DEIBNTION UNDER 1HE AADAA 
V CRAFTING A PLATFORM FOR THE ADDICT: THE RIGHTS OF 
THOSE COMPULSORILY DETAINED 
A Introduction 
In part ill A above, we discussed philosophical shades to social control with 
which one can approach the AADAA. Patient status, as described by his or her rights, 
is a good indicator of just where the balance between treatment and penal models rests. 
Once compulsory detention is approved, our philosophical approach and level of true 
concern to assist the individual is partly revealed by our recognition of patient rights. Is 
there, for example, a right to treatment? What is arbitrary detention? 
B The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
I Section 22 - arbitrary arrest or detention 
Section 22 of the BORA protects liberty of the person. It declares that 
"[e]veryone has the right not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained. "118 Article 5(1) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (quoted above in part II A) similarly 
articulates a right not to be deprived of one's liberty unless it is prescribed by law, and 
for one of a list of specific purposes. Within that list, paragraph (e) permits the 
" ... lawful detention of [among others] ... alcoholics or drug addicts .... "119 
In its Bozano Judgement, the European Court of Human Rights (the "ECHR") 
interpreted 'lawful detention' to mean detention which is not arbitrary. 120 Hardly 
helpful to interpreting s 22 of the BORA! However, in its Winterwerp Judgement 
handed down 7 years earlier, the ECHR declared that committing a person to a 
psychiatric institution is not arbitrary if made in conformity with both the procedural 
and substantive requirements of domestic law. 121 It also held that European member 
states ought to operate in accordance with a principle of " ... fair and proper 
procedure .... "122 
l l8 Article 9 of the United Nations' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also 
preserves a right to freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention. 
119 See above part II A. 1 
l20 ECHR Ser A, No ill, p 23, para 54, 18 December 1986; discussed by MG Wachenfeld "The I { 
Human Rights of the Mentally Ill in Europe" (1991) 60 Nordic J'nal of Int'l Law 115, 141. _J 
121 ECHR Ser A, No 33, p 17, para 39, 24 October 1979. 
122 Above n 120, pp 19-20, para 45. 
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Procedure can be queried in two respects. The first complaint may be that it is 
simply not followed. The second: that the procedure endorsed by law is unfair. 
Wachenfeld addresses the former, saying:123 
[t]he point of insisting on procedural regularity is precisely to ensure that a 
right so vital as that of liberty is not taken away without the benefit of a 
thorough, fair procedure that is not only just but is seen to be just. The 
essence of a complaints-based human rights system is to protect the 
individual from governmental sleight of hand that 'gets it almost right'. 
In regard to the latter, the point is that legitimising per se any detention prescribed by 
law whatever its form is to steal from article 5(1)(e)'s relatively toothless grip, the 
wherewithal to purchase itself some ill-fitting second-hand dentures. This latter 
criticism entails, in the case of legislation, a judicial challenge to the sovereignty of 
Parliament. That alone is a huge topic, and one which the writer does not intend to 
address here. 
In Re M,124 Gallen J considered the the case of a person committed pursuant to 
the Mental Health Act 1969. M challenged his detention, citing s 22 of the BORA. M 
had threatened to kill a woman with whom he was obsessed, and threatened violence 
toward Television New Zealand. Psychiatric evidence indicated that M laboured under 
delusions and was mentally ill. 125 Considering the application of s 22, Gallen J 
mid: 126 
... the Judge is required to observe those principles that are imposed 
statutorily or which are accepted as being applicable within the system as a 
whole. To go outside those principles or to act on some other basis would 
in my view be arbitrary .... Looked at in that light, something is arbitrary 
when it is not in accordance with the law or which is not in accordance with 
the principles which the law regards as appropriate for discretion to be 
operated within. 
Exactly what comprises 'arbitrary detention' remains somewhat elusive. Just 
what are those principles " ... which are accepted as being applicable within the system 
as a whole"? Perhaps all we can be sure of, is that Gallen J would not ignore or alter 
any of the criteria imposed by statute. His Honour may, however, be persuaded to add 
criteria thereby making it more difficult to prove a detention is arbitrary. 
123 Above n 120,151. 
124 [1992] 1 NZLR 29. 
125 Above n 124, 40. 
126 Above n 124, 41 (emphasis added). 
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In Re S, 127 Barker J referred to the Mental Health Act 
1969 saying:"[s]ection 
66 makes it clear that detention is legal. Detention 
as a status is therefore not arbitrary 
per se. "128 That much is also made clear in s 22 of
 the BORA. His Honour goes on to 
say, however, that: "[t]he detention will become arb
itrary if it is unprincipled, or is for 
a prohibited purpose." 129 Again, therefore, the 
judiciary refers to some implicit 
collection of 'principles' which remain unextrapolate
d. 
2 Section 11 - refusing medical treatment ~, ~ l 
In Re S, a patient released on leave from a psychiat
ric institution objected to a 
condition of his release. This condition compelled h
im to submit to regular medication 
administered at his home by hospital personnel. S c
ontested this condition, citing s 11 
of the BORA. Section 11 provides that "[e]veryone 
has the right to refuse to undergo 
any medical treatment." Barker J considered that "'e
veryone' in respect of s 11 must 
mean 'every person who is competent to consent."
' 130 Being mentally disordered did 
not automatically deem a person incompetent, 
although these two things would 
commonly exist contemporaneously.131 
Barker J held S,to be incompetent, primarily because
 he failed to appreciate" .. . 
the significance of the treatrnent...,"13
2 or his " ... need for continuing treatment.. .. "133 
The failure of many addicts to appreciate the fact tha
t they 'have a problem' (adverted to 
earlier)134 tends to indicate that s 11 would not permit
 them to refuse medical treatment. 
Chavkin raises the possibility of a right to refuse trea
tment where drugs hold the 
potential for dangerous side effects.1
35 In Mills v Rogers136 the US Supreme Court 
also applied a competency test, whereby involunta
ry treatment is permitted only if it 
would have been accepted voluntarily by the pat
ient were he or she competent to 
decide.The inherent danger here, is that a patient's c
ompetence might be assessed using 
the decision to refuse treatment as an indicator of inc
ompetence. 
127 [1992) 1 NZLR 363. 
128 Above n 127, 374. 
129 Above n 127, 374. 
l30 Above n 127,374. 
131 Above n 127, 374. 
132 Above n 127,374. 
133 Above n 127, 375. 
134 See above n 37 and accompanying text. 
135 Above n 44, 281. 
136 457 us 210 (1990). 
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In New Zealand, s 6(3) of the PPPRA provides a 
good model for the courts to 
follow in this area. It provides that: 
[t]he fact that the person in respect of whom the app
lication is made ... has 
made or is intending to make any decision that a person exerci
sing ordinary 
prudence would not have made or would not make gi
ven the same 
circumstances is not in itself sufficient ground for the
 exercise of [the court's 
jurisdiction]. 
Although an addict will rarely be 'competent' acco
rding to Barker J's analysis of s 11 
of the BORA in Re S, the question of competence m
ust remain quite separate from the 
individual decision to accept or refuse treatment. 
In reference to s 11 and the BORA, this is an ideal
 place to note that rights and 
freedoms prescribed in that Act are expressly circum
scribed in two important ways: 
(a) Pursuant to s 4, no provision of any enactment p
assed before or after 
the BORA is impliedly repealed, revoked, or made
 invalid or ineffective 
" ... by reason only ... " that the provision is inconsis
tent with the BORA. 
However, when it can be given a meaning consiste
nt with the BORA, 
that meaning is preferred. 
(b) Section 5 provides for justified limitations upon
 any BORA right or 
freedom as is " ... demonstrably justified in a free an
d democratic 
society." 
Barker J could have simply utilised s 5 to limit the sc
ope of s 11. 
3 Section 23 - rights upon detention 
Subsection (l)(a) of this provision confers upon a
 person arrested or detained 
pursuant to the AADAA or any other enactment the
 right to be informed promptly of the 
reason(s) for it. Further, subs (5) demands that a de
tainee be " ... treated with humanity, 
and with respect for the inherent dignity of the pers
on." 
C The MH(CAT) A: A Mode/for AADAA Review?
 
l Part VI of the MH(CAT)A- patient rights 
Appointed in 1983, the Departmental Task Force
 on Alcohol Related Issues 
formulated 3 principles for consideration in alterin
g the AADAA. Principle 1 endorsed 
compulsory detention, principle 2 narrower definit
ions, and principle 3 was a mandate 
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to develop provisions protecting the rights of AADAA patients " ... comparable to those 
in the proposed Mental Health Bill."137 
That Bill now constitutes the MH(CA T)A (in amended form). Part VI of that 
Act elucidates certain 'rights' for patients who are mentally disordered and subject to 
compulsory assessment and treatment. Each so-called 'right' is in fact described as an 
'entitlement'. The reason (if any) for this contrast in terminology from the BORA is 
obscure. It may merely reflect, as the writer contends, the fact each Act is administered 
by a different government department The MH(CAT)A is administered by the Ministry 
of Health, while the BORA is the property of the Department of Justice. If this is so, 
there is some scope for improved research upon the part of departmental draftspersons, 
so that unintentional inconsistencies are avoided. As the MH(CA T)A stands, a 
practitioner bereft of other ideas might contend that an 'entitlement' is something less 
than a 'right'. 
A court would probably reject such a contention. The potential for the argument 
itself, however, is unfortunate. Rights are never absolute by definition, and must be 
weighed against community interests and the rights of other individuals. Entitlements 
must be similarly assessed, and a valid distinction with rights is increasingly 
inconspicuous. 
Section 64 "entitles" every patient to a written statem~nt of his or her " ... rights 
as a patient." 138 It then "entitles" every patient to information updates on those 
"rights",139 and "in particular", those "rights" listed ins 64 (2)(a) - (e). 140 The phrase 
"in particular" in s 64(2) indicates quite plainly that although ss 65 - 74 speak only of 
entitlements, there are rights listed outside of s 64. 
In conjunction with s 5, s 65 entitles a patient to be treated with proper respect 
for his or her " ... cultural and ethnic identity, language, and religious or ethical 
beliefs ... ;" 141 and proper recognition of " ... the importance and significance to the 
patient of the patient's ties with his or her family, whanau, hapu, iwi, and family 
group .... 11 142 
137 Above n 2, 2-3. 
138 Section 64(1). 
139 Section 64(2). 
140 These include the right to review pursuant to s 16; the right to review by Review Tribunal 
pursuant to ss 79 or 80; and the right to appeal to the court under ss 83 or 84. 
141 Section 5(a). 
142 Section 5(b). 
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Section 66 entitles a patient to treatment, s 67 to have treatment explained before 
it is administered, and s 68 to be informed of the use of video or audio recording. A 
patient is permitted independent psychiatric advice pursuant to s 69, and legal advice 
pursuant to s 70. A patient is entitled to the company of others,143 and at certain times 
to receive visitors and make phone calls. 144 He or she may receive and despatch letters 
pursuant toss 73 and 74. With necessary, incidental amendments, these rights could be 
transposed into the AADAA regime. 
2 Consent and the compulsory patient 
Sections 57 - 63 of the MH(CA T)A establish a presumption in favour of 
obtaining a patient's consent to treatment before carrying it out. This does not apply in 
the first month of a detention order,145 and the presumption may be abrogated where 
treatment is considered " ... to be in the interests of the patient... "146 by an independent 
psychiatrist. 147 
Evidence cited above demonstrates that coercion is an effective tool in treating 
alcohol and drug abuse.148 A presumption in favour of obtaining patient consent is, 
therefore, of uncertain utility. The presumption might also denote an unwieldy 
procedure, because the responsible clinician who is familiar with the patient's case 
requires confirmation from an unassociated practitioner that his or her proposed course 
of treatment is " ... in the interests of the patient."149 On the other hand, if reasonably 
practical, this procedure could operate effectively to facilitate automatic second-
opinions. If the s 59 mechanism can work smoothly in this way for practitioners 
dealing with alcoholics and drug addicts, then the writer endorses such an approach. 
D A Right to Treatment? 
This right is intimately connected with the purpose behind detaining a small 
percentage of the population for alcoholism or drug addiction. As noted above, s 66 of 
the MH(CAT)A entitles a patient to appropriate treatment and care. The ethos behind 
143 Section 71. 
144 Section 72. 
145 Sections 58 and 59(1). 
146 Section 59(2)(b). 
147 Appointed by a Review Tribunal (s 59(2)(b)). 
148 See above part II B. 
149 Section 59(2)(b). 
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such a right is to place a corresponding duty upon the state to address the question of 
appropriate treatment in individual cases, and to continually evaluate such treatment. 
The long title to the AADAA expressly refers to making better provision for the care 
and treatment of alcoholics and drug addicts. A set of patient rights could, therefore, 
comfortably admit a right to treatment This also tends to confirm the appropriateness of 
a treatment model rather than a penal model. 
VI ADVOCATES, INSPECTORS, LA WYERS, CALL THEM WHAT 
YOU WILL: THE CASE FOR PATIENT REPRESENTATION 
A Establishing A Right 
Section 35(2) of the AADAA provides that: 
[e]very person who is the subject of any such application shall be entitled to 
be heard and to give evidence and may be represented by a solicitor or 
counsel (emphasis added). 
Hopefully, a court would interpret this provision as 'entitling' a patient to legal 
representation, and that 'entitlement' interpreted, in tum, as a right. To avoid any 
ambiguity, s 35(2) should be amended to follow s 70150 of the MH(CAT)A. Legal 
counsel becomes increasingly important as patient rights are recognised and articulated. 
They help enforce those rights, and make review proceedings truly accessible. 
Courts in the United States have held that those subject to sanction under the 
criminal justice system, have no right to counsel during their initial medical 
examination. 151 In Johnson v Woods, 152 the court held that this step in proceedings 
was a " ... non-critical stage ... " (when considering a right to counsel) because the 
medical practitioner acted diagnostically, and not as an agent of the applicant. One 
hopes this is true. Practice, however, may well prove otherwise. When a person's 
liberty hangs in the balance, the obligation to protect the interests of those least able to 
protect themselves must outweigh judicial expediency. The right to counsel, must, 
therefore, accrue on being required to undergo a medical examination under s 9(5). 
l50 Section 70, (as amended by the recommendations in part V C 1 above). 
l5 l Above n 38, 72. 
l52 323 F Supp 1393, 1398 (CD Cal 1971). 
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B The MH(CAT)A & The Health Commissioner Bill 
The Health Commissioner Bill (the "HCB ") contemplates establishing a Health 
Consumer Advocacy Service. 153 Advocates are appointed by the Health 
Commissioner,154 to (among other things): 
(a) promote consumer awareness of the Code of Health Consumers' 
Rights;155 
(b) provide advice; 156 and 
(c) receive complaints and assist aggrieved health consumers in 
pursuing any complaint resolution mechanism.157 
The MH(CAT)A has already established a system involving 'District Inspectors' 
("DI's"). 158 Pursuant to s 76(9) - (11) (clinical reviews) and s 79(12) - (14) ('Review 
Tribunal' 159 review), a DI is to consult with the patient, ascertain his or her wishes, 
and consider whether an appeal to the Review Tribunal or Court is appropriate. Just 
how DI's will fit in with the Consumer Advocacy Service is unclear. 
If mental health is the preserve of DI's, then some thought might be given to the 
differences in the DI and Advocacy Service mandates prescribed in the MH(CA T)A and 
HCB respectively. Is the disparity warranted? 
Most psychiatric institutions now refuse to accept patients referred to them 
under the AADAA. 160 They no longer maintain alcohol or drug programmes,161 
leaving the Salvation Army 'Bridge' programmes in Auckland162, Wellington, and 
Christchurch as the main committal destinations. 163 They are, therefore, outside of the 
DI mandate, and free to adopt the Consumer Advocacy Service Model. 
An amendment to the HCB would focus advocate attention not just upon the 
proposed Code of Health Consumers' Rights but on all rights articulated in the BORA 
and the amended AADAA itself. 
153 Clause 20. 
154 Clause 21(1). 
155 Clause 22(a). The Code is currently under consideration and is outlined in clause 17. 
l 56 Clause 22(t). 
l57 Clause 22(g)-(i). 
158 Defined ins 2. 
159 The functions of which are described in ss 101-104. 
l60 Dr GM Robinson (FRACP) - interview with writer on 1 September 1993. 
l6l Above n 160. 
l62 The Auckland programme is situated on Rotoroa Island, in the outer reaches of Waitemata 
Harbour. 
163 Above n 160. 
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VII REVIEW PROCEEDINGS, APPEALS AND REMEDIES 
A Judicial Review 
Article 5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights declares that: 
[e]veryone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be 
entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall 
be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not 
lawful. 
Pursuant to article 2(3)(a) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
each signatory164 similarly undertakes:165 
[t]o ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are 
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation 
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity. 
To be consistent with the fact a patient's condition changes, this right must be 
continuously, or at least periodically assertable. In New Zealand, decisions to commit 
and (refuse) release are judicially reviewable pursuant to statute,166 and also that body 
of relevant public law. In essence, judicial review guarantees that a judicial authority, 
independent of the executive, medical practitioners and relatives, controls the process of 
initial and continued detention, and release.167 
B Clinical Review & Review Tribunals 
After 6 months, any patient, pursuant to s 18, can request the Minister of Health 
or the institution to discharge her. If refused, she can apply to the High Court.168 No 
further application from a patient will be entertained until a further 6 months has 
elapsed. 169 As evidence shows that very few patients are detained for the maximum 
l64 New Zealand is such a signatory. The BORA's long title indicates that it was enacted partly for the 
purpose of incorporating the tenns of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights into 
domestic law. 
165 [1990-92] 1 NZBORR xliv, xiv. 
l66 The AADAA s 9, the MH(CAl)A s 84, and the BORA s 27. 
167 Wachenfeld, above n 120, 166. 
l68 Section 18(1). 
l69 Section 18(7). 
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permitted time of 2 years, 170 6 months seem a little long. In fact, "[t]he length of stay 
data presented ... indicates few patients remain in treatment after six months." 171 
When comparing the AADAA with the MH(CA T)A, the obvious question is 
whether a system of review tribunals ought to be instituted in the alcoholism and drug 
addiction regime. The AADAA does not provide for regular clinical reviews by the 
responsible doctor. This is a glaring inadequacy. Section 76(1) of the MH(CAT)A 
provides for a formal review 3 months after the date of a compulsory treatment order, 
and thereafter at 6 month intervals. The writer prefers intervals of 3 months. 
The psychiatrist completes a certificate of clinical review,172 and if fit for 
release, a patient is discharged from compulsory status. 173 If the patient is not fit for 
release, the certificate is copied to the Review Tribunal, patient, and others, all of 
whom are informed of the opportunity to appeal to the Review Tribunal. Such appeals 
take place pursuant to s 79 and may be upon application,174 or upon the motion of the 
Review Tribunal itself.175 There follows a right of appeal to the District Court.176 
Review tribunals under the MH(CAT)A are, as yet, largely unproven. If they 
are transposed into an AADAA regime, they automatically make the rights to counsel, 
notice and information of paramount concern. These must be included in any reform of 
the AADAA. AADAA review tribunals could be appointed by the Minister of 
Health, 177 and include a barrister or solicitor to assist the tribunal in coping with the 
Act. More realistically, however, the volume of work generated for an AADAA tribunal 
could be efficiently dealt with by conferring upon MH(CA T)A tribunals a second 
jurisdiction. Psychiatric tribunals have been criticised in some jurisdictions for their 
medical bias,178 but this is inevitable and axiomatic. It is not, in the writer's view, a 
criticism at all. 
170 M Routledge Period of Detention (Unpublished paper, Ministry of Health Management Services & 
Research Unit, Wellington, 1984) 1. 
171 Above n 170, 2. 
172 Section 76(3). 
173 Section 76(5). 
174 Section 79(1). 
175 Section 79(2). 
176 Section 79 (12). This is very often dealt with by the Family Court Division, and a similar role 
might be suitable under the AADAA. 
177 See the MH(CAl)A s 101. 
178 H MacDonald Reviewing The Compulsory Status Of Psychiatric Patients (Unpublished paper, 
VUW, 1993). 
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C Other A venues of Redress 
Laudably, nothing in the AADAA appears to prohibit private actions based in 
tort such as false imprisonment, battery, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Section 18(6) expressly preserves common law remedies and their causes of action.1 79 
Just as any list of patient rights ought not to be exhaustive, preserving common law 
actions in this manner brings with it the flexibility and experience of the common law. 
The MH(CAT)A's s 75 procedure for bringing a complaint that a breach of 
rights has occurred is also a good model for the AADAA. Unfortunately, s 75 applies 
only to those rights specified in part VI of the MH(CA T)A. This is inconsistent with 
formulating a non-exhaustive list of rights and, therefore, the AADAA (as well as s 7 5 
of the MH(CAT)A) ought not be so confined. 
D Legaf Aid 
Section 19 of the Legal Services Act 1991 makes legal aid available in court 
proceedings. However, for proceedings in a tribunal, the road to the cash is more 
treacherous. They must constitute proceedings in an: 180 
... administrative tribunal or judicial authority ... where ... the case is one that 
requires legal representation having regard to the nature of the proceedings 
and to the applicant's personal interest; and ... the applicant would suffer 
substantial hardship if aid were not granted. 
Vlll MODESOFTREATMENT 
A The Least Restrictive Alternative 
Section 8 of the PPPRA endorses an ethic of making the " .. .least restrictive 
intervention [in the life of the subject] possible .... " This ethic is consonant with the 
PPPRA's presumption of competence. 181 It is also consistent with a focus upon 
treatment rather than detention. Under the auspices of the AADAA, an ethic in favour of 
179 Section 18( 6) provides: 
Nothing in this section shall prevent the exercise of any available remedy or 
proceeding by or on behalf of any person who is, or is alleged to be unlawfully 
detained. 
l80 Legal Services Act 1991 s 19(e)(v)-(vii). 
l8l Sections 5 & 24 expound this presumption of confidence. 
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the least restrictive alternative (the 11LRA11 ) would regulate (among other things) choice 
of treatment, availability of leave, and the initial decision to commit The last element is 
attested to by the Task Force's first principle, which said: 182 
[c]ompulsory detention under the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Act 
should apply only when no alternative and reasonable remedy for assisting 
the alcohol or drug dependent person is available or accepted. 
The LRA ethic also constitutes a bench-mark against which independent review of 
proposed treatments (to which the patient does not consent)183 can be evaluated. 
The LRA must be applied carefully, however. Hafemeister and Amirshahi 
record that the LRA principle has induced 11 ••• a considerable backlash .... 
11 184 In the 
mental health context, it is associated with the premature return to the community of 
mentally disordered persons. If a release is premature, however, then it is not a viable 
alternative at all. The LRA is not a licence for more relaxed treatment options. It is 
designed, instead, as a license to reduce the intrusive quality of alcohol and drug 
addiction treatments as much as is reasonably practicable. The danger a patient poses to 
himself or herself and the community will always impact upon what is the LRA for a 
particular patient. Every patient should have known his or her own LRA assessment. 
B Community Treatment 
In accordance with the LRA, the validity of continued confinement in an 
institution depends upon the persistence of a condition that is untreatable in a less 
restrictive, yet practical setting. Dr GM Robinson sees considerable scope for 
community care of alcoholic and drug addicted persons.1 85 To some extent, this is 
facilitated by the availability of prescription drugs such as 'antabuse'. These induce 
illness and vomiting if a patient subsequently consumes alcoholic liquor. Used in 
appropriate cases where the patient has also exhibited positive psychological change, Dr 
Robinson sees such drugs as quite effective. Each case must be considered separately 
to determine whether the drugs are appropriate. The treatment obviously relies upon 
antabuse or generics being ingested by the patient. A responsible and willing friend or 
relative might, in suitable circumstances, supervise this. 
Community treatment will be appropriate in some cases. Treatment schemes 
should, after all, seek to empower the court with a full range of viable options. These 
l 82 Above n 2, 2. 
183 See above part V C 2. 
184 Above n 38, 85 . 
185 Above n 160. 
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the court (and medical personnel) can use to tailor an appropriate programme for each 
individual. Options may include outpatient orders or an order for particular treatment in 
a non-custodial context 
C Aftercare 
When a patient returns to the same situation in the community which helped 
precipitate his or her addiction, the potential for recidivism clearly exists. Therefore, 
release ought to be also tied to ~ehabilitation. This is consistent with the state's purpose 
being one of benevolent intervention with a view to treatment and cure rather than 
punishment. 186 Leave ought to be carefully monitored and swiftly revoked when 
necessary .187 
IX IS LEGISLATION INDEPENDENT OF THE MH(CAT)A 
NECESSARY? 
A The Issue 
The Mental Health Foundation of New Zealand has called for the AADAA to be 
repealed and incorporated within the framework of mental health legislation. A review 
of available sources discloses a number of advantages for retaining the AADAA. In this 
section, however, the writer outlines the various arguments, and evaluates each. 
B Arguments For & Against Retaining a Separate AADAA Regime 
One commentator asserts that " ... alcohol and drug problems do not fit well into 
other areas of health service provision. "188 She contrasts the multidisciplinary approach 
required, with that used to provide mental health services. How much more 
multidisciplinary alcoholism and drug addiction treatment really is, however, is moot. 
The commentator offers no supporting evidence. Indeed, the MH(CA T)A Review 
Tribunals must include 3 persons, only one of whom must be a psychiatrist. 189 
Further, under s 103 a Review Tribunal may call upon the expertise and knowledge of 
any person whose input is thought to be of assistance.190 
l86 Above n 38, 93. 
187 See above n 79 and accompanying text. 
l88 M Routledge A & DA Act - The Need For Separate Legislation (Unpublished paper, Ministry of 
Health Management Services & Research Unit, Wellington, 1983) 2. 
l89 Section 101(2). A second must be a barrister or solicitor. 
l 90 Section 103(a). 
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Psychiatric hospitals no longer have specific alcohol and drug treatment 
programmes. 'Bridge' personnel are both conversant with the AADAA system, and 
independent of the mental health establishment. 191 They are volunteer groups. There 
would, therefore, be significant practical difficulties in placing such a group under the 
control of the 'Director of Area Mental Health Services. '192 
Perhaps the most significant stumbling block to incorporating the AADAA 
under mental health legislation is the fundamental criteria for committal under the 
MH(CAT)A. A person must be 'mentally disordered' before the sanction of 
compulsory detention can be imposed. If we broadened this definition to include 
alcoholics and drug addicts, we open the door to legislatively induced ignorance, 
prejudice, and embarrassment Just labelling alcoholics or addicts 'mentally disordered' 
might discourage applicants from seeking treatment a loved one desperately needs. 
Those who might have sought treatment of their own volition may no longer do so. 
They could admit to having a drinking or drug problem, but are most unlikely to 
consider themselves 'mentally disordered'! 
There will also be numerous instances within the MH(CA nA, where specific 
departure from the terms and conditions of the Act are necessary to provide for ex-
AADAA patients. This will be laborious, make the MH(CAT)A unwieldy, 193 and 
betray a duality which is already demonstrated by the current existence of separate 
legislation. There are similarities, and the writer has already indicated those which are 
appropriate for inclusion in a revised AADAA. Both Acts comprise compulsory 
schemes and deal with medical patients. For the reasons already elucidated, however, 
we must not push these similarities beyond their practical utility. 
To some extent this discussion is academic. Section 4(d) of the MH(CAT)A 
provides that compulsory assessment and treatment orders may not be invoked against 
a person " ... by reason only ... " of substance abuse. Current legislative opinion, 
therefore, also favours a separate AADAA regime. 
l9l R Thornton Alcohol Abuse and the Mental Health Act (Unpublished paper, Department of Health, 
Wellington, 1983) 3. 
l 92 Defined in the MH(CA T)A s 2. 
l93 Above n 191, 3. 
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X CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS FOR ANY REVIEW OF THE 
AADAA 
A Family Group Conferences 
The definitions of 'mental disorder', 'alcoholic' and 'drug addict' each 
incorporate some sense of the impact a subject's behaviour has upon family and 
friends. The Maori response to such persons may, however, be somewhat different to 
that anticipated by the AADAA. A Maori approach might, for example, utilise concepts 
of iwi, hapu, and whanau in a way more akin to the family decision-making model 
under the CYPFA.194 The family group conference need not, however, be limited in its 
application by culture. 
Where a child or young person is found to be in need of care or protection 
pursuant to s 18 of the CYPFA, a family group conference is mandatory. In the context 
of an alcoholism and drug addiction regime, this is probably too inflexible. The 
AADAA usually processes adults, and family responsibilities wane with age. 
The most appropriate course might be to designate a person to decide in each 
case whether a family group conference is appropriate. If such a system is established 
by statute, it ought to be funded by the state. This would include transport and 
accommodation costs for a~ending family members. Section 22 of the CYPFA defines 
who can attend conferences for the purposes of that Act. A similar list could be 
formulated for AADAA purposes. It would include the s 9 applicant, the subject's 
spouse, and any person who is a 'relative' pursuant to s 9(8) of the AADAA. A 
discretionary power may rest in the conference convener to preclude persons upon the 
basis that their presence is unnecessary or undesirable.195 
In some cases, the conference may be able to persuade the subject that he or she 
has a problem and displace the siege mentality of denial which so many addicts exhibit. 
He or she may then seek treatment voluntarily. Section 9 could be amended to permit 
the court to adjourn and allow a conference to take place prior to medical assessment 
and to the making of an order. If the applicant is not satisfied with the conference 
outcome, a conventional s 9 application may resume. 
194 See ss 17-38 of that Act 
195 This is similar to the power of the Care and Protection Co-ordinator under s 22(1)(b)(ii) of the 
CYPFA. 
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B Injerting A Little Colour 
In 1987, the Langford Oration of the Royal Australian College of Medical 
Administrators investigated the proposition of an integrated approach to health care, 
saying: "[t]he Government has recognised that its policies and practices need to take 
into account other (than Western) cultural views." 196 In 1986, the Department of 
Health (now the Ministry of Health) issued a memorandum to all hospital boards urging 
them to consider the principles of the Treaty of W aitangi ( 1840) as a basis for planning 
and policy. 197 Such a vague direction sets 'tokenism'-alarms ringing loud and true. 
Recent enactments have, to a certain extent, realised the goal of legitimising the 
injection of cultural information into medico-legal proceedings. These include the 
CYPFA family group conference model, and the MH(CAT)A's declaration in support 
of: 198 
(a) ... proper respect for the patient's cultural and ethnic identity, language, 
and religious or ethical beliefs; and 
(b) ... proper recognition of the importance and significance to the patient of 
the patient's ties with his or her family, whanau, hapu, iwi and family 
group, and the contribution those ties make to the patient's well-being. 
Section 65 'entitles' a patient to be treated in accordance with the spirit and intent of s 5. 
No similar provision exists in the AADAA. 
If tokenism is to be avoided, however, a practical legitimacy beyond mere 
rhetoric and lip-service must be attributed to Maori norms and tapu (along with those of 
other cultures). If an alternative Maori treatment is to gain legitimacy, however, it must 
prove itself credible and effective. This is a difficult task. The way to begin, though, is 
to broaden the cultural capacity of the AADAA. It must cater for all of society (as all 
health legislation must), or it will tend to strait-jacket society, and thus earn its 
contempt Clause 22(c) of the HCB requires that consumer advocates have: 
.. .regard to the needs, values, and beliefs of different cultural, religious, 
social, and ethnic groups, [and] ... provide information and assistance to 
health consumers and members of the public for the pUipOses of -
(i) [p]romoting awareness of health consumers' rights [; and] 
196 MH Durie An Integrated Approach to Health and Health Care (The Royal Australian College of 
Medical Administration, Auckland, 1987) 6. 
197 Above n 196, 6. 
198 MH(CAT)A s 5. 
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(ii) [p]romoting awareness of the procedures available for the resolution of 
complaints involving a possible breach of the Code of Health Consumers' 
Rights: 
The HCB thus commends to advocates an appreciation of both the individuality and 
diversity of their potential client base. This ethic is entirely appropriate for inclusion in a 
reformed AADAA. 
XI CONCLUSION 
The AADAA contemplates its use as a conduit for both those who are 
committed during civil proceedings, and those referred from the criminal justice 
system. The CJA 1985, however, does not contain a parallel provision to s 48A of the 
CJA 1954. This empowered a court to commit those subject to criminal sanction to an 
alcoholism or drug addiction centre instead. None of the CJA 1985 sentencing options 
appear to facilitate AADAA detention. Ifs 9 applications are to be made in such cases 
then the AADAA must reflect that intention. If not, s 48A should be reinstated. 
A treatment model is the most appropriate ethic with which to approach AADAA 
reform. It is not a penal statute, but one characterised ostensibly by benevolence and a 
desire to cure. The AADAA certainly plays an important role in social control, and 
provides various benefits to society. Its focus, however, remains in treatment and 
rehabilitation. 
The task of composing a new AADAA regime should also be guided by a 
collection of underlying principles that seek to shape the treatment model. The first of 
these is the LRA, adequately described above.199 Community integration is a principle 
worthy of thought, but is probably subsumed by the LRA. The potential pitfalls of 
community care have been highlighted, and it should not, therefore constitute a prime 
objective. It remains one of a number of treatment options. 
The PPPRA's presumption of competence, and the MH(CAT)A's ss 57-63 
presumption in favour of obtaining informed consent speak of an underlying principle 
of 'respect for the patient's wishes'. Only when treatment remains necessary and the 
patient intransigent should benevolent paternalism enter the process. 
199 See above part VIII A. 
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The more traditional 'best interests' principle precipitates an unfortunate 
propensity toward less consultation with the patient. It ought to be discarded in favour 
of 'respect for the patient's wishes'. This does not supplant coercive treatment 
techniques, which remain. Rather, it offers the patient an opportunity to acknowledge 
his or her drug problem and begin upon the road to psychological and physiological 
recovery. Patient rights also form an important part of patient empowerment, and help 
ensure appropriate and timely assistance. 
Evidence shows that, in terms of treatment outcome, coercion is just as effective 
as non-coercive treatment techniques. It is an important tool, therefore, in treating those 
persons who will not enter treatment voluntarily. Why society subjects the human 
agents of certain activities to coercive remedy and not others is a difficult question. 
Perhaps some activities threaten social norms to a greater degree than others. The 
pervasive and cruel effects of alcoholism and drug addiction are socially destructive, 
and harm more than just those persons primarily afflicted. The AADAA's coercive 
technique, therefore, is both useful and effective. 
The current AADAA definitions of 'alcoholic' and 'drug addict' should be 
narrowed to encompass only those who are chemically addicted. The committal criteria 
in s 9 refer to the 'truth' of an application, and the 'expediency' of making an order. 
The reference to truth is unfortunate and ought to be omitted. In regard to discharge, the 
willingness of a friend or relative in s 18( 4) to supenise the subject feeds into the 
expediency test. If this also applies under s 9, that should be made clear. The NCCA's 
proposed s 9(6A), which seeks to provide certifying practitioners with more 
information is a quality amendment. The value of s 9A adjournments, however, is less 
clear. 
Section 9(1) currently places the burden of proof upon the subject: This is 
unfortunate. The burden of proof ought to rest upon the applicant, and the appropriate 
standard of proof is the commonwealth's civil measure. The US distinction between 
'clear and convincing proof, and 'the preponderance of evidence' the writer suggests, 
is purely academic and impractical. Given the reaction of relatives, the wisdom of s 
9(2)'s presumption in favour of relatives making the applications is questionable. 
Section 8 patients will rarely be true volunteers. This is implicitly recognised by 
s 8(2), which requires an undertaking from the patient that he or she will remain in 
treatment until discharged. Ifs 8 is retained, however, a voluntary patient must retain 
that status after committal and have the right to discharge herself. 
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Patient rights must be elucidated, and can be modelled upon those in the 
MH(CAT)A. Its s 75 complaints mechanism, however, requires broader application. If 
the Health Consumers' Advocacy Service is to act in the AADAA field, the advocates' 
mandate must also be broadened to encompass rights not expressly included in the 
proposed Code of Health Consumers' Rights. Important rights include those to 
information, representation and treatment itself. 
Provision for itinerant ~linical review of a patient's condition is a glaring 
inadequacy in the AADAA. Review Tribunals might also be appropriate as an 
intermediate adjudicatory body prior to litigation. How Review Tribunals operate under 
the MH(CAT)A should assist an assessment of their appropriateness for the AADAA 
context. 
In regard to choice of treatment, the LRA principle provides a quality ethic 
against which one may determine the appropriate treatment for any particular patient. 
Community treatment may also be appropriate in some circumstances, especially when 
combined with drugs such as 'antabuse'. 
New Zealand law exists in a culturally diverse setting, and any health care 
programme must attempt to cope with such diversity. The AADAA must, therefore, 
provide for the input of non-Western thought. The HCB and MH(CAT)A have begun 
upon this road. A review of the AADAA ought to continue this process, and confer 
upon minority New Zealand groups a legitimacy in all spheres of health care. In 1966 
the AADAA began a commendable effort to improve the lot of alcohol and drug 
dependent persons. The writer's recommendations seek to continue this process. 
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